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This paper proposes a novel approach to systems modelling based on responsibilities. The approach is designed
to help users identify and analyse the hazards and associated risks that can arise in complex socio-technical
systems that span organisational boundaries. Through a case study this paper shows how the technique can
identify the vulnerabilities that may arise because human, organisational or system agents fail to discharge the
responsibilities assigned to them.
1 INTRODUCTION
Existing risk analysis techniques commonly focus on
the interaction of technical aspects of systems. How-
ever, we argue that within complex systems socio-
technical factors, including the interaction of people
with technical components, and the effect of environ-
ment on those interactions provides a different per-
spective on the risks associated with a system. This
view is especially relevent to safety and mission criti-
cal systems,where signiﬁcant consideration is needed
to the risks associated with system change & evolu-
tion. For example, elections are considered mission
critical to the government, which is bound by law to
conduct them at set periods. They are also mission
critical to the councils which are bound to collect and
collate ballots to an acceptable level of accuracy to
the populace. Both can involve signiﬁcant amounts of
technology, but it is the risks of the technology com-
bined with the level of training, and the capabilities
of the staff involved that inﬂuence the success of an
given election process.
We believe Responsibilities are a natural form of
expression for risk analysis within complex socio-
technical systems. We have developed the technique
of Responsibility modelling, an approach which al-
lows stakeholders to explore the hazards and associ-
ated risks related to a given responsibility model in a
structured and logical manner. These models can then
be used to mitigate or avoid the risks associated with
mis-understandings, and provide support for the anal-
ysis of potential process changes.
This paper puts forward an approach which com-
bines responsibility modelling with additional hazard
& risk data. We argue that this technique is useful in
both the design of new systems, and, in the analysis,
evolution and reassessment of existing systems. The
modelling process is one of collaborative working, in
that several stakeholders, perhaps not co-located, use
thetechniqueto buildand analyseresponsibilitymod-
els augmented with this additional data. Dependent
on the domain the stakeholders could be developers,
managers, end-users or any stakeholders who have a
need to understand and reach a collaborative agree-
ment on either the way a system needs to work, or the
way in which it already does.
We have developed tools to provide both a stan-
dalone, and a web based version of the responsibility
modelling, which allows multiple users to work col-
laboratively on editing and analysing a given model
via a web interface to an SQL server. Our tools pro-
vide a complete graphical environment to support the
description and modiﬁcation of keywords attached
to responsibility model entities and relationships. We
support the ability to compare models of the same re-
sponsibilities, in a ‘before and after‘ style which al-
lows users to beneﬁt from system overviews that can
be used to easily identify fundamental changes in a
visualand moreuserfriendly format than writtendoc-
umentation alone.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section
2 provides background on responsibility modelling.
Section 3 reviews prominent risk / hazard modelling
techniques. Section 4 explains how we have extended
responsibility modelling to encompass the beneﬁts of
these techniques. Section 5 provides an overview of
our work on evaluating the technique using a case
study based on the Scottish Elections in 2007. Finally,
section 6 outlines future work in this area and draws
conclusions.
12 RESPONSIBILITY MODELLING BACK-
GROUND
For our purposes, we deﬁne a responsibility as:
A duty, held by some agent, to achieve,
maintain or avoid some given state, subject
to conformance with organisational, social
and cultural norms.
The term ‘duty‘ in this context refers to more than
simply a statement that a given task should be com-
pleted. It also encompasses aspects of accountability.
The terms organisational, social and cultural norms
relate to the inherent nature of responsibilities; that
systems are adapted to ﬁt the culture they operate in,
that processes have to work within the social frame-
work of both legal and domain standards. Responsi-
bilities are rarely broken down to individual instruc-
tions,as theyrepresent higherlevelconstructsencom-
passing a remit for initiative. Initiative is bounded by
professional conduct, from an organisational perspec-
tive as well as the wider social and cultural ones.
Responsibility modelling has been proposed by
several authors (Blyth et al. 1993; Dobson and Som-
merville 2005; Strens and Dobson 1993) as a useful
construct for analysing the dependability of socio-
technical systems. In addition to achieving system
goals, both social and technical entities contribute to
the broader dependability of a system. The notion
that human agents in a system, if employed appropri-
ately, can contribute positivelyto the dependability of
a technical system is one that is often missed in dis-
cussionsof softwaredependability(Besnard and Bax-
ter 2003) (Besnard and Greathead 2003).
We use responsibilities within a graphical mod-
elling environment that encompasses Responsibili-
ties, Agents and Resources, connected by a number of
relationships. The following sections only provide an
overview of the responsibility modelling technique,
focussing instead on the addition of Hazard Analysis.
For more information on Responsibility modelling in
general we recommend reading (Lock et al. 2009).
Graphical models of responsibility were ﬁrst pro-
posed by Blyth et al in the ORDIT methodology
(Blyth et al. 1993), a notation for describing the re-
sponsibilities that agents hold with respect to one an-
other. Strens, Dobson and Sommerville have argued
for the importance of analysing responsibility and the
need to view roles with respect to the responsibility
relationships that exist between them (Dobson 1993;
Dobson and Sommerville 2005; Strens and Dobson
1993). Dewsbury and Dobson have edited a collec-
tion of papers (Dewsbury and Dobson 2007) that de-
scribe much of the research undertaken on responsi-
bility as part of the DIRC project 1, presenting analy-
1http://www.dirc.ac.uk
sis of inappropriate responsibility allocation in socio-
technical systems.
Similar in intent, goal based modelling approaches,
such as i* and KAOS are intended to expose high
level dependencies between objectives in a given sys-
tem (Darimont et al. 1997; Yu 2002). Goals can be
hierarchical and achieved through the fulﬁllment of
some or all sub-goals.
Despite some similarities, responsibility modelling
differs from goal based techniques. Whilst the notion
of responsibility modelling may be viewed as incor-
poratingthespeciﬁcationofobjectivestobeachieved,
there is also an acknowledgment that in complex
socio-technical systems, the achievement of an objec-
tive (i.e. the discharge of responsibility) is subject to
a range of constraints and that even with the best ef-
forts of an agent, a goal may not be achieved. These
constraints are difﬁcult to explore and model using
a goal-based approach which focuses principally on
what has to be achieved. In contrast to goal based
approaches, there are circumstances in which an au-
thority may judge that a responsibility has been ap-
propriately discharged, despite the fact that a associ-
ated goal has not been achieved. Woods has noted (in
the context of accountability and learning in health
care organisations) how actors are required to cooper-
ate with regard to individual responsibilities in order
for broader organisational responsibilities to be dis-
charged (Woods 2005). The notion of responsibility
embodies an assumption that it is how an agent acts
and not just what is achieved that is important.For ex-
ample, a doctor who has carried out the correct proce-
dures may have successfully discharged their respon-
sibility for patient care, even though a patient dies.
For the purposes of this paper the entities and rela-
tionships we are dealing with are outlined in ﬁg 1 and
match the key below:
Responsibility: A stated activity or abstract concept
Information Resource: For example a report or
database
Physical Resource: For example a piece of equip-
ment
Human Agent: For example, an election clerk
Organisational Agent: For example the govern-
ment
Responsible For: The allocation of an agent to a re-
sponsibility
Has:Theallocationof resources to agents orrespon-
sibilities
Subordinate To: To model organisational hierar-
chies
2Figure 1: Responsibility Modeling Key
Acts As: For example Bob acts as an election clerk
Association: Used to annotate models with relation-
ships of a domain speciﬁc type. These could be
anything for example, for example to show A
cannot occur at the same time as B.
3 RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
This section explores two prominent risk analysis
techniques that use keywords to guide analysis. In
building a responsibility modelling technique for risk
analysis we build upon many of the concepts de-
scribed here.
HAZOPS (Kletz 1999) is a goal driven method
originally developed by ICI for the chemical indus-
try. It focuses on the identiﬁcation of potential haz-
ards using keywords and associated risks through in-
depth descriptions of the system in question, with
a focus on technical operability and efﬁciency. HA-
ZOPS keywords are used to construct tables examin-
ing the effect of deviation from the norm for a given
process. For example: Given a speciﬁc deviation for a
given process, (something occurring early, late, never,
in reverse, to much etc); what are the consequences;
what actions could be taken to mitigate the conse-
quences; what safeguards could be put in place; what
is the risk of the occurrence of the deviation etc. HA-
ZOPS is applied predominantly at the mechanical,
rather than socio-technical systems level. The HA-
ZOPS approach is a recognition that the use of codes
of practice and standards can only partly eliminatethe
risks associated with the implementation of systems,
and that many failures are anticipatable and avoidable
given appropriate contingency planning.
A number of software tools for HAZOPS have
been developed (eg:Dyadem2) but these are targeted
at chemical applications and are not generally avail-
able on an open source basis. The key beneﬁts of the
2http://www.dyadem.com/products/phapro/
HAZOPS approach include;
• The promotion of systematic understanding of
all processes and resources within the system,
and examination of the environment in which the
system operates. This in turn can be used to ﬁnd
and evaluate hazards and ameliorate risks asso-
ciated with operation of the system.
• By examining the consequences of different sce-
narios in a systematicmanner it is possibleto de-
termine the effect of failures on other parts of a
given system.
• HAZOPS has a demonstrable effect (Pully 2004)
in reducing the number of ‘snagging‘ issues dur-
ing the running-in of complex technical systems.
Hazops is however not suitable for the wider socio-
technical system domain due to its reliance on com-
pleteness, and focus on low level technical activity se-
quences. This prevents HAZOPS from analysing hu-
man behaviour, and also makes it too complex a tech-
nique to be used without considerable effort on the
part of investigators.
Hollnagels (1998) Cognitive Reliability and Error
Analysis Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel 1998) is de-
scribed as a second generation human reliability anal-
ysis method, because it uniﬁes best practice from the
ﬁelds of human reliability and the cognitive sciences.
The former is often more concerned with predict-
ing human behaviour, usually in a quantiﬁable way,
whilstthelatterismoreconcernedwithunderstanding
and explaining human behaviour with a view to being
able to predict it under given circumstances. CREAM
can be used retrospectively to analyse the possible
causes of an accident that has happened, or prospec-
tively to identify the possible failures that could lead
to accidents. In CREAM performance takes place in a
context deﬁned by the interaction between three high
level factors: the human operator; the technology; the
wider organisation (including the physical environ-
ment in which the system is located). CREAM cate-
gorises erroneous actions using a small set of possible
error modes or effects (Hollnagel calls them logical
phenotypes): timing, duration, force, distance, speed,
direction, object and sequence, each of which can
manifest itself in only a few ways. So, for example,
withinthe timingcategory, an action can be erroneous
because it is too early, too late, or omitted.
CREAM can be applied to socio-technical do-
mains, however it relies on sets of pre-deﬁned crite-
ria and types which have to be followed rigorously to
achieve results. Again, the role of CREAM investiga-
tor is not one that can be carried out without signiﬁ-
cant training. As with HAZOPS, there is a lack of tool
supportto ease theintroductionofCREAM to awider
audience.
34 ADAPTATION AND EXTENSION OF RE-
SPONSIBILITY MODELLING FOR USE IN
RISK ANALYSIS
We provide coverage for both entity and relationships
types in what we term ’risk clauses’. These outline
the entity involved, its associated hazards and con-
text, combined with the risk of occurance and sever-
ity. More speciﬁcally a risk clause deﬁnes the follow-
ing data:
Target The entity / relationship to which the clause
refers. For example the entity in question could
be a responsibility, or a resource expected to be
used. A relationship could include the allocation
of a resource to a group for use in a situation.
Hazard Usinga restricted set ofkeywordsweaim to
focus discussions by giving a clear checklist of
hazards categories to consider. The hazard key-
words we use are adapted from HAZOPs and are
outlined below:
• Early Occurrence of the entity/relationship
before required
• Late Occurrence of the entity/relationship
after required
• Never Non-occurrence of the en-
tity/relationship
• Incapable If the occurrence of the en-
tity/relationship could not take place even
though planned
• Insufﬁcient Occurrence of the en-
tity/relationship at an incorrect level
• Impaired Occurrence of the en-
tity/relationship in an incorrect manner
Condition The potential conditions that could arise
with relation to the hazard occurring. Where
multiple conditions exist, these would be seper-
ated out for individual consideration.
Risk We deﬁne risk in this context as a combination
of the probability of the hazard and the severity
of the hazard occuring. The research is designed
toaddress thedeﬁciency intoolswhich end users
could use, without speciﬁc domain knowledge
of industry metrics. We currently use qualitative
terms to allow prioritisation using terms such as
low, medium and high.
Consequences The potential effects of the hazard
manifesting itself.
Recommended Actions The cause(s) of action, ei-
ther mitigation or avoidance, that could be taken
to deal with the situation in question. Whether a
given course of action should be taken is tem-
pered by economic, organisational & political
factors and as such isn’t explored in more depth
through responsibility modelling. It instead pro-
vides a starting point for further deliberations.
We believe that responsibility models can be used
to represent existing organisational structures where
the allocation of resources and personnel to responsi-
bilities is something which has already occurred. We
alsobelievethatresponsibilitymodelscan beuseddy-
namically to represent evolving situations. For exam-
ple, a new piece of equipment is supplied to an agent.
In this case risk clauses are not only useful to deter-
mine the effect of that piece of equipment being used
too late, or not used at all, or used incorrectly etc in
the furtherance of a responsibility; but also whether
the relationship of allocation itself occurs too late or
early etc.
Withinour modelswe separate these by associating
allocation risk clauses with the arrows, and by associ-
ating usage risk clauses with the entities. For clarity,
to illustratethedifference between theuseofthesame
clause on allocation and use the following example is
put forward:
The equipment is allocated too late (a
clause attached to the ‘has‘ relationship
between a responsibility/person and a re-
source)
vs
The equipment is used too late (a clause
attached to the ‘resource‘ entity for the
equipment in question)
Althoughbothmayhavethesameconsequence,ac-
countability could differ. A person cannot be held ac-
countable for a situation where they have been allo-
cated the right equipment too late to make use of it. If
however they already have the right equipment they
may be held accountable for not using it.
5 CASE STUDY
During 2007 our research group acted as observers
for the Scottish Elections accredited by the Electoral
Commission. The 2007 Scottish elections involved
the use of E-Counting, something that had not been
previously attempted. E-Counting in this instance in-
volved the use of paper ballots that were then ma-
chine read, tallied and stored. Our accreditation al-
lowed us access to preparatory literature, training ma-
terials and brieﬁngs prior to the election, plus access
to the polling stations and counts. We were able to
contribute to the discovery of issues relating to the
4election (Lock et al. 2008), includinginputto the gov-
ernment Gould Report (Gould 2007). By constructing
responsibilitymodels from the data we had avaialable
to us we believe many of the problems that occurred
could have been discovered and discussed before the
event. This section describes some of the models we
have constructed that show how responsibility mod-
elling could have helped in collaborative discussions.
One of the issues that faced those working at the
count were related to the E-counting machines them-
selves. The elections used electronic readers to scan
normal paper ballots and automatically determine the
voter’s intentions. Several problems emerged. Figure
2 outlines the responsibilities of three different agents
which were concerned with the counting process it-
self. Firstly, the DRS operators (a largely deskilled
position), in charge of reﬁlling the hopper with un-
scanned votes and monitoring for problems (most no-
tablypaperjams).Secondly,theDRStechnicianswho
were more highly skilled, and capable of rectifying
problemsdiscoveredwith thecountingmachines. The
diagram states that the DRS technician is ’respon-
sible for’ the DRS machine. This is shorthand for
inserting an additional responsibility, of maintaining
the resource, to which the machines would be ’allo-
cated to’, and the technician made ’responsible for’.
Thirdly, the political party ofﬁcials who, up until that
election had provided a check against corruption by
performing their own count of votes as the process
went on. In a normal election these unofﬁcial coun-
ters havemanaged to tallyresults towithin5-10% and
as such provide an important feature of British elec-
tions. The replacement of hand counting by a DRS
counting machine however mean’t that the speed of
scanning made hand counting impractical. Interest-
ingly this had not become clear to the political ofﬁ-
cials until the process was actually underway. In col-
laborative discussions the responsibility model would
have illustrated the fact that although the DRS and
party ofﬁcials would not under normal circumstances
meet, they needed to be aware that they were both
trying to operate on the same resources; albeit from a
passive context for the party ofﬁcials.
This data could also have been used to promotedis-
cussion of the strategy for dealing with impaired pro-
cessing speeds of the counting machines, and the sub-
sequent demands on the DRS technicians (of which
there were an insufﬁcient quantity). Figure 4 shows
some examples of risk clauses derived from this sce-
nario. Notice that the consequence of one given situ-
ation, that of a breakdown (impaired operation) of a
given machine makes calls on another resource, the
DRS technician who is therefore under greater load.
Figure 3 outlines the adjudication process that took
place on ballots. The ajudication process consisted of
thoseballotsthat could not meet theautomated count-
Figure 2: Partial DRS Counting machine responsibil-
ity model
ing systems threshold for decision making. First, an
ajudication process involving the council authority
staff dealt with those ballots that were easily resolv-
able. These often included ballots where stray lines,
caused by the scanning of folded paper produced
enough doubt in the system to pass these to ajudica-
tion. Second, the returning ofﬁcer, and their deputies
in consultation with the party ofﬁcials dealt with
those that remained. This was achieved using a sep-
arate area containing a workstation and accompany-
ing data projector to allow close observation by mul-
tiple people. One of the major issues that would have
been spotted with modelling was that the returning
ofﬁcer, and their deputies responsibilities remained
broadly the same between manual and E-count elec-
tions, whereas their workload increased dramatically.
Problems related to folded ballots etc, caused ajudi-
cations that the system, and the council staff couldn’t
deal with alone. Council staff had no access to the
complete ballot, only to parts of it. Hence lines ac-
cross the sheet were difﬁcult to interpret and dismiss.
The resultant load on the returning ofﬁcers slowed
the count in many cases, and led to returning ofﬁ-
cers and their deputies needing to move between dif-
ferent responsibilities in different parts of the count
halls. Given the risks associated with introducing new
technology it could have been anticipated that a heav-
ier than normal load on those in managerial control
would result. A more delegated responsibility struc-
ture would have been considerably more robust.
The responsibility model also illustrates the inabil-
ity of the socio-technical system to deal with prob-
lems caused by the ballot database, which acted as a
single system, integrated into many of the processes
involved in the count. Delays in processing queries
from the adjudication process, and from other pro-
cesses caused by database issues contributed to much
of the inefﬁciency seen at the counts. At Edinburgh
problems with the database caused the count to be
closed down temporarily for repairs, reopening the
5Figure 3: Ajudication & database interaction
next day. In Edinburgh’s case the processing of large
numbers of adjudications prevented the system from
keeping up with ballot indexing, eventually causing
thesystemto crash. Giventhat theballotdatabasewas
a critical resource relatively little consideration was
given to it in preparatory material or in the dicussions
on deployment of the E-Counting system beforehand.
Figure 5 shows a subset of the risk clauses associ-
ated with the returning ofﬁcer / deputies and the balot
database. In particular, this example shows the im-
portance of context to the analysis of risk, as differ-
ent levels of failure were observed during the process.
The result of persistent overloading of both returning
ofﬁcer / deputies and the ballot databases shows that
theprocedurefordealingwithlowlevelsofoccurance
were not in place, and that nothing could be done at
the time to mitigate the problems caused by higher
levels of occurance.
Figure 6 shows the risks associated with the pro-
cess of adjudication itself. Both party ofﬁcials and
local authority / returning ofﬁcers had the responsi-
bility of overseeing the stages of adjudication, but
the speed of adjudication brought on by the introd-
cution of an electronic system impaired the process.
This ocurred as those operating the adjudication ter-
minals became familiar with the motions they needed
to go through, and began moving at speed through
adjudication without giving the party ofﬁcials time
to consult or in some cases even think about given
cases. This was compounded by system design de-
cisions which prevented operators from going back
more than one adjudication to make a change. As
the speed of adjudication ran at around 2 seconds per
case party ofﬁcials often lost the ability to query de-
cisions before they could stop the process. As such,
the two safety factors in adjudication, having two op-
erators, and having party oversight failed due to the
unforeseen consequences of speeding up the process.
Throughout the count issues relating to the relagation
of political representatives was pravelent, and it was
clear that insufﬁcient consideration had been given to
their role at the design stages.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion this paper has put forward a novel ap-
proach combining our existing notions of responsibil-
ity modellingwith hazard / risk based keywords capa-
ble of extending our existing responsibility modelling
research. We are currently developingtools to analyse
the data stored by our models. In particular we are in-
terested in highlighting critical entities and relation-
ships. Such an approach could for example provide
visual cueing of the most connected processes, agents
and resources. We believe visualisation of such con-
cepts, in a similar form to that currently performed
within many network analysis tools could be used
to further reinforce the recognition of potential trou-
blespots in a model. We are also developing ‘what if‘
style capabilities to allow users to simulate responsi-
bilityfailures andunderstandtheconsequencesacross
a model of a given scenario. Such functionality would
be useful in simulated exercises of the type used in
the civil emergency domain in order to stress plans to
eliminate problems and improve training.
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